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Abstract 
We explore how globalization, broadly conceived to include international human-
rights norms, humanitarianism, and alternative trade, might influence peaceful and food-
secure outlooks and outcomes.  The paper draws on our previous work on conflict as a 
cause and effect of hunger and also looks at agricultural exports as war commodities.  We 
review studies on the relationships between (1) conflict and food insecurity, (2) conflict 
and globalization, and (3) globalization and food insecurity.  Next, we analyze country-
level, historical contexts where export crops, such as coffee and cotton, have been 
implicated in triggering and perpetuating conflict.  These cases suggest that it is not 
export cropping per se, but production and trade structures and food and financial policy 
contexts that determine peaceful or belligerent outcomes.  Export cropping appears to 
contribute to conflict when fluctuating prices destabilize household and national incomes 
and when revenues fund hostilities.  Also, in these scenarios, governments have not taken 
steps to progressively realize the right to adequate food or to reduce hunger and poverty.  
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1.  Introduction 
This paper explores how globalization, broadly conceived to include international 
human-rights norms, humanitarianism, and alternative trade, might influence peaceful 
and food-secure outlooks and outcomes.  For more than two centuries, proponents and 
critics of an open global economy have debated whether the free flows of goods, services, 
and capital make the world more or less peaceful and food secure.  Proponents argue that, 
as nations expand the commercial, financial, communications, and cultural ties that bind 
them, they are less likely to go to war (see Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003 for a 
summary of these positions).  Critics counter that as global economic liberalization 
worsens socioeconomic inequalities within and between nations, conflict frequently 
follows (see, for example, Danaher 1994; Lappé, Collins, and Rosset 1998; Shiva 1999; 
Bello 2001; Araghi 2000; on the ills of financial globalization, see Stewart 1993; Smith 
1994; Addison 2005). 
Not surprisingly, the two sides disagree over whether more liberalized trade in 
agricultural commodities will provide a “way out” of poverty for developing-country 
farmers and economies or exacerbate their poverty problems; so much depends on 
contexts.  What is not in dispute is that trade in primary commodities is associated with 
most wars of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, either as cause or source of conflict, or as 
means of payment for arms and armies (P. Collier 2003).  Because conflict contexts are 
integrally linked to food insecurity (Messer, Cohen, and d’Costa 1998; FAO 2000), the 
connections between global trade and conflict are a concern for food and nutrition 
policymakers, who are especially interested in agricultural commodities, which have been 
left out of most globalization–conflict models (see, for example, P. Collier 2003). 
As our previous studies have demonstrated (Messer 1994, 1996a; Messer, Cohen, 
and D’Costa 1998; Messer and Cohen 2001; Messer, Cohen, and Marchione 2001), most 
wars of the late 20th century and early 21st century are “food wars,” meaning that food is 
used as a weapon, food systems are destroyed in the course of conflict, and food 
insecurity persists as a legacy of conflict.  We have shown that food insecurity, which as 2 
used here can denote food shortage, lack of access to food, malnutrition, or some 
combination of the three, can also be a source of conflict.  Our concern here is to 
demonstrate how globalization, including trade in primary agricultural commodities but 
also global norms and institutions promoting humanitarianism, human rights, and 
alternative development and trade, is connected to conflict and food insecurity. 
Our entry point to explore these connections is to examine cases of food wars for 
a single year, to see whether and how the associated country-level attributes of conflict, 
food security, and trade in agricultural and other primary commodities support 
globalization-and-peace, globalization-and-war, or neither hypothesis.  
Because no previous studies explicitly attempt to explore the links among all three 
factors, a second way to consider the relationships is to summarize and integrate the 
analytical frameworks and findings of the many previous studies that have dealt with any 
two of the three factors:  conflict and food insecurity, conflict and globalization, and 
globalization and food insecurity.  This literature review fills gaps and critiques certain 
conclusions of the existing conflict-transformation literature, which emphasizes conflict 
typologies and historical trends. 
A third approach is to sketch particular country-level, historical contexts where 
widely grown and traded agricultural commodities, such as sugarcane, coffee, and cotton, 
appear to have contributed to conflict, to see what lessons these cases suggest for 
agricultural policy. 
A fourth, and final perspective is to consider where globalization, widened in 
concept to include humanitarian operations, human-rights norms, and alternative trade 
organizations, appears to have contributed to more peaceful and food-secure outlooks and 
outcomes.  We conclude by suggesting how greater scrutiny of the local and country-
level conditions of agricultural production and trade, and this broader globalization 
concept, might be useful for formulating more comprehensive agricultural, globalization, 
and conflict models for research and policy. 3 
2.  Conflicts, Food Insecurity, and Globalization, and Their Consequences 
The simplest way to gauge the connection of globalization to food insecurity and 
conflict is to identify, classify, and count conflict countries, and then, for each, ascertain 
and describe the country’s food-security status and openness to trade, and how these 
relate to conflict.  If the simplified pro-trade position (“globalization/more liberalized 
trade is peace-promoting”) is correct, then we would expect conflict countries not to be 
heavily involved in trade, which is supposed to create peace-promoting ties, and instead 
to be relatively isolated.  An aggregate picture of the resulting conflict–food insecurity–
globalization scenarios also offers a snapshot in time of how globalization is promoting 
peace or conflict in the initial years of the 21st century. 
The results of this exercise, which we undertook in 2003, using 2002–03 as our 
year of record, describe 44 countries:  24 active conflict, 18 postconflict, and 2 refugee-
recipient countries where war-related violence, economic and public-welfare disruptions, 
and refugee flows contributed to food insecurity.
1  Map 1 shows conflict countries and 
aggregate percentages of food-insecure people; Map 2 displays conflict countries and 
estimated needs for humanitarian assistance.  Tables 1 and 2 characterize these countries, 
using standard world data sets, to show conflict status (Marshall and Gurr 2003; 
Eriksson, Wallensteen, and Sollenberg 2003; SIPRI 2003a), the food-insecure portion of 
the populace (FAO 2003), the population considered in need of humanitarian assistance 
by the United Nations (UN) system (OCHA 2003), major exports (CIA 2003), and 
openness to trade (defined by the U.S. government’s State Failure Taskforce and the 
World Bank as imports and exports as a share of gross domestic product, or GDP) (Esty 
et al. 1995; World Bank 2003).
                                                 
1 We used the definitions of armed conflict of the Conflict Data Program at Uppsala University:  an armed 
conflict is a contested incompatibility, which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, result in at least 25 battle-
related deaths.  A minor armed conflict is one with 25 deaths but fewer than 1,000 during the course of the 
conflict.  An intermediate conflict is one with over 1,000 deaths during the course of the conflict, but fewer 
than 1,000 in any given year.  See http://www.pcr.uu.se/basicSearch/definitions_all.htm.  In keeping with 
this definition, the current political situation in Zimbabwe is not considered “war,” although it has many of 











Population in need 
of humanitarian 
assistance (percent 
of total population) Major  exports 
Imports + 
exports/GDP  Notes 
  (percent)     (percent)   
Sub-Saharan Africa  33 16,636,000 
(2.8%) 
 57   
  Burundi  70  416,000 
(6.8%) 
Coffee, tea, sugar, cotton  29  Active, high-intensity 
  Congo, Republic of  30  174,000 
(4.7%) 
Oil, coffee, cocoa, sugar, timber, 
diamonds 
105  Sporadic fighting. Active, medium-intensity 
  Congo, Democratic 
Republic of  
75 2,600,000 
(4.6%) 
Diamonds, oil, coffee, copper, cobalt  15  “African World War”; 16 million food insecure 
people in country. Active, low-intensity 
  Côte d’Ivoire  15  3,000,000 
(9.2%) 
Cotton, coffee, cocoa, oil  76   
  Ethiopia  42  4,200,000 
(6.7%) 
Coffee, qat, bauxite, alumina, gold, 
diamonds, fish 
—  Ethnic rebellions ongoing in drought-affected 
regions; internal displacement from past wars. 
Active, low-intensity 
  Guinea  28  400,000 
(6.4%) 
Bauxite, alumina, gold, diamonds, 
coffee, fish, agricultural products 
40 Refugees 
  Liberia  42  1,000,000 
(23.6%) 
Rubber, timber, iron, diamonds, 
cocoa, coffee 
— Active,  low-intensity 
  Rwanda  41  40,000 
(0.5%) 
Coffee, tea, hides, tin ore  15  Low-intensity conflict continues. Active, 
medium-intensity 
  Somalia  71  750,000 
(9.4%) 
Livestock, bananas, hides, fish, 
charcoal, scrap metal 
—  Active, low intensity 
  Sudan  25  2,800,000 
(7.3%) 
Oil, cotton, sugar, gum Arabic, 
livestock, sesame, peanuts 
29 Active,  high-intensity 
  Tanzania  43  506,000 
(1.4%) 
Gold, coffee, cashew nuts, 
manufactures, cotton 
24 Refugees 
  Uganda  19  750,000 
(3%) 
Coffee, fish, tea, cotton, gold, flowers  33  Active, high-intensity 
Asia  16
a  7,100,000    East Asia: 66 
South Asia: 24 
 
  Afghanistan  70  4,100,000 (14.3%)  Opium poppies, heroin, cotton, 
carpets, gems 
— Active,  medium  intensity 
  Burma (Myanmar)  7    Heroin, wood products, rice, pulses, 
beans, fish 
—  Rebellions in Shan and Karen States. Active, 
multiple medium-intensity conflicts 
  India  21    Textile goods, gems and jewelry, 
engineering goods, chemicals, leather 
manufactures 
20  Border conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir 
(productive farming territory); localized 
rebellions. Active, multiple conflicts of intensities 
ranging from low to high (Kashmir) 
  Indonesia  6  3,000,000 
(1.4%) 
Oil and gas, electrical appliances, 
plywood, textiles, rubber 
62  Separatist rebellion in Aceh, with 15 percent of 






Population in need 
of humanitarian 
assistance (percent 
of total population) Major  exports 
Imports + 
exports/GDP  Notes 
  (percent)     (percent)   
  Nepal  17    Carpets, clothing, leather goods, jute 
goods, grain 
43 Active,  high-intensity 
  The Philippines  22    Electronic equipment, machinery and 
transport equipment, garments, 
coconut products, chemicals 
98  Communist and Muslim insurgencies, military 





  Sri Lanka  25    Clothing, tea, diamonds, coconut 
products, petroleum products 
73  Cease-fire holding in most conflict zones. Active, 
low-intensity 
Europe  —  1,200,000    Europe and Central 
Asia: 66%; Europe 
EMU: 56% 
 
  Russia  4  1,200,000 
(0.8%) 
Petroleum and petroleum products, 
natural gas, wood and wood products, 
metals, chemicals, a wide variety of 
civilian and military manufactures 
60  Separatist rebellion in oil-rich Chechnya. Active, 
medium-intensity 
Latin America  10 3,000,000 
(0.6%) 
 30   
  Colombia  13  3,000,000 
(6.6%) 
Cocaine, coffee, cut flowers, coal, 
clothing 
30 Active,  high-intensity 
  Haiti  49    Manufactures, coffee, oils, cocoa  46   
  Peru  11    Fish and fish products, gold, copper, 
zinc, crude petroleum and by-
products, lead, coffee, sugar, cotton 
33  
Near East/North Africa  10 28,500,000 
(7.3%) 
 52   
  Algeria  6    Oil  54  Active, medium-intensity 
  Iraq  27  27,000,000 
(100%) 
Oil  —  Active, high-to-medium intensity. United Nations 
appealing for food aid for entire populace. 
  Israel-Palestine  —  1,500,000  Fruit, vegetables, limestone (West 
Bank and Gaza) 
63 Active,  medium  intensity 
  Turkey  3    Apparel, foodstuffs, textiles, metal 
manufactures, transport equipment 
65 Active,  medium  intensity 
Total countries in conflict   56,436,000       
Sources: OCHA (2003); Marshall and Gurr (2003); SIPRI (2000); Eriksson, Wallensteen, and Sollenberg (2003); CIA (2003); USCR (2000); FAO (2003); World 
Bank (2003). 
a Excluding Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 
7 






Population in need 
of humanitarian 
assistance (percent 
of total population) Major exports 
Imports + 
exports/GDP  Notes 
 (percent)      (percent)   
Sub-Saharan Africa  33 10,090,000    57   
  Angola  49  3,700,000 
(28.2%) 
Crude oil, diamonds, refined petroleum products, gas, 
coffee, sisal, fish and fish products, timber, cotton 
127  Returnees in need of assistance 
  Central African Republic  44  2,200,000 
(59.5%) 
Diamonds, timber, cotton, coffee, tobacco  29   
  Eritrea  61  2,300,000 
(52.3%) 
Livestock, sorghum, textiles, food  97  IPDs, returnees in need of assistance 
  Mozambique  53  590,000 
(3.4%) 
Aluminum, prawns, cashews, cotton, sugar, citrus, 
timber, bulk electricity 
66  Landmines, damage to human and 
physical capital 
  Sierra Leone  50  1,300,000 
(22.8%) 
Diamonds, cocoa, coffee  25  Returnees, refugees in need of 
assistance 
  South Africa      Gold, diamonds, platinum, other metals and minerals, 
machinery and equipment 
53  
  Togo  25    Re-exports, cotton, phosphates, coffee, cocoa  82   
Asia  16
a  1,000,000    East Asia: 66% 
South Asia: 24% 
 
  Cambodia      Timber, garments, rubber, rice, fish  115  Landmines 
  Tajikistan  71  1,000,000 
(15.2%) 
Cotton, textiles, electricity  147  Large population remains internally 
displaced 
Europe          
  Armenia  51    Diamonds, mineral products, foodstuffs, energy  72   
  Azerbaijan  21    Oil and gas (90%), machinery, cotton, foodstuffs  81   
  Bosnia  8    Metals, clothing, wood products  85 (2000)   
  Georgia  26    Scrap metal, machinery, chemicals, fuel re-exports, 
citrus fruits, tea, wine 
60  
  Serbia  9    Manufactured goods, food and live animals, raw 
materials 
—  
Latin America  10  403,000    37  Landmines remain a problem in 
Central America 
  El Salvador  14  143,000  Coffee, sugar, textiles, electricity, light manufacturers  59   
  Guatemala  25  260,000  Coffee, sugar, bananas, other fruits, vegetables, meat, 
electricity, oil, clothing 
39  
  Nicaragua  29    Coffee, shrimp and lobster, cotton, tobacco, bananas, 
beef, sugar, gold 
—  
Total countries postconflict   11,493,000       
Sources: OCHA (2003); Marshall and Gurr (2003); SIPRI (2000); Eriksson, Wallensteen, and Sollenberg (2003); CIA (2003); USCR (2000); FAO (2003); World Bank (2003). 
a Excluding Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 
89 
The maps and tables indicate, not surprisingly, that conflict and post-conflict 
countries tend to be food insecure, with greater than 20 percent of the population and in 
many cases far more, lacking access to adequate food, although not all highly food-
insecure populations are in conflict countries.  Comparison of columns 1 and 2 in Tables 
1 and 2 show that the food-insecure percent of the populace usually far exceeds the 
percent of the population judged to be in need of humanitarian assistance.  The wide 
ranges in these numbers also suggest that judgments of food insecurity and humanitarian 
need may require additional country-by-country scrutiny in a careful comparison.  We 
see, furthermore, that a number of active conflicts did not generate UN appeals for 
humanitarian assistance, although the conflict countries in question (Nepal, the 
Philippines, and Sri Lanka) had a substantial incidence of food insecurity overall, and the 
actual conflict situations constituted “food wars.”
2  It is also true that there are a number 
of countries with very high levels of food insecurity and no conflict, such as India and 
Niger. 
Regarding the assertions that globalization promotes peace or that openness to 
trade lowers conflict potential, we observe that a simple measure of “openness to trade” 
at one point in time appears not to be a good indicator of conflict potential or food 
security status.  These wide-ranging numbers do not support the proposition that 
openness to trade is peace promoting.
3  
The evidence presented in the tables also appears to refute the notion that, after 
10-plus years of globalization, the 2000s are becoming more peaceful than the previous 
decade, as some analysts assert (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 616; Marshall and Gurr 2003, 1; 
Human Security Centre 2005).  What they classify as “interstate” wars of the 1980s and 
1990s may be fewer and less intense, but internal conflicts multiplied during the 1990s, 
elevating the total number of wars at least to prior levels (Smith 1997), and significant 
                                                 
2 We do not consider here appeals for humanitarian assistance based on natural disaster (unless the disaster 
is coupled with a conflict or postconflict situation) or economic collapse in which significant violence is 
absent (for example, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). 
3 Future research should try to capture, via time series data, the likely lagged effects of openness to trade on 
conflict. 10 
interstate (really, transnational) wars erupted in the 2000s in Afghanistan and Iraq, as 
many of the civil wars of the previous decade wound down.
4  Also, continuing food 
insecurity in former war zones potentiates renewed conflict in the future. 
Peace appears to be breaking out only if analysts intent on counting negotiated 
settlements as “peace” subtract the high-intensity and prolonged conflicts in Angola and 
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan, as well as all Latin American conflicts 
except Colombia (Marshall and Gurr 2003, 47 and passim).  However, conflicts continue 
in some of these locales (in parts of Angola and Ethiopia, for example) at varying degrees 
of intensity, promising negotiations in Sri Lanka and Sudan may well break down, cease-
fires in places such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia exist only on 
paper, and whether peace can be sustained in Angola or Sierra Leone remains an open 
question.  If U.S.-led military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq is included in the 
equation, then it seems premature at best to declare that the 2000s will be more peaceful 
or have fewer interstate wars than the 1990s, as proponents of the pacific qualities of 
globalization frequently claim. 
Taxonomies of conflict, moreover, do little to elucidate the impact of the fighting 
on food security and other livelihood considerations.  There is, for example, considerable 
debate over whether women and children account for a disproportionate share of those 
                                                 
4 In any event, distinctions between internal and interstate warfare have blurred (Collins and Weiss 1997).  
Twenty-four years of civil war in Afghanistan have featured significant Pakistani, Soviet, Tajik, Uzbek, 
United States, and now, European intervention (SIPRI 2003a).  The nominally internal conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), often characterized as “Africa’s World War,” has involved 
military forces from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, and natural resources plundered 
to pay for this conflict have passed through Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, 
Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, on their way to market (Global 
Policy Forum 2005; UN Security Council 2003).  Hostilities in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and 
early 2000s involved not only opposing Bosnian, Croatian, Kosovar, Serbian, and other troops, but also 
international forces for peacemaking, peacekeeping, and emergency relief, as well as Muslim volunteers 
from around the world (SIPRI 2003a).  Many or most of the “internal” wars that occurred during the Cold 
War period were similarly transnational.  For example, during the 1975–92 conflict in Mozambique, the 
government received substantial Soviet aid, while Rhodesia and South Africa backed the rebels (Nordstrom 
1999). 11 
affected.
5  Nor do the taxonomies shed much light on the role of globalization in 
fomenting or resolving conflict.  In the countries we have characterized as postconflict, 
such as Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Nicaragua, the consequences of 
previous wars continue to exact a toll on food security and economic development.  
These countries continue to suffer the consequences of food wars, which deliberately 
destroyed agricultural production capacity, markets, and health infrastructure (see Simler 
et al. 2004 on Mozambique, for example), while landmines and unexploded ordnance 
continue to kill, maim, and make farming hazardous.  
In sum, we agree with Marshall and Gurr (2003, 2), who note that “The 
globalization of the economy, of communications, and of governance by their very nature 
creates new threats and challenges, as well as opportunities.”  Conflict scenarios, which 
usually involve food insecurity, also involve international flows in arms and other 
commodities as aspects of globalization.  It is therefore necessary to probe the steps by 
which globalization contributes to conflict or peaceful outcomes in particular cases. 
3.  Conflict Scenarios 
Over the past decade, analysts have proposed a number of scenarios and 
correlations connecting globalization, conflict, and, less consistently, food insecurity.  
We summarize the views of the key analysts in Table 3 and provide a more detailed 
discussion of their findings below.  
Conflict as a Cause of Food Insecurity, Reducing Availability, Access, and 
Utilization 
Food-(in)security studies, including our own, document an unsurprising overlap 
between conflict and food insecurity.  Elsewhere we have quantified the impact of conflict 
                                                 
5 It is common to find claims such as “80 percent. . . of refugees are women and children” (Women’s 
Commission for Refugee Women and Children 2002).  However, a 2000 study by the office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees casts serious doubt on claims of statistically significant gender disparities 
in refugee populations (USCR 2000). 12 
on food availability:  cumulative declines in mean food production and growth rates of 
food production in 13 of 14 African conflict countries during 1970–94 (Messer, Cohen, 
and D’Costa 1998; Messer, Cohen, and Marchione 2001).
6  Using the same methodology 
and extending the analysis through 1997 and across regions, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) found that, during 1970–97, the developing 
world experienced conflict-induced losses of agricultural output of $121 billion in real 
terms.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, the losses in the 1980s and 1990s accounted for more than 
50 percent of all aid received and far exceeded foreign investment inflows (FAO 2000). 
Table 3—Contending schools of thought on conflict, globalization, and food security 
Analyst  Main cause(s) of conflict  Role of globalization  Role of food insecurity 
State Failure Taskforce  Nondemocratic governance  Lack of openness to trade 
contributes to conflict. 
High infant mortality 
contributes to conflict. 
Environmental security  Intergroup competition over 
scarce resources 
None specified  Food insecurity is a 
manifestation of resource 
scarcity. 
Ethnic conflict  Intergroup competition over 
wealth and power 
None None 
UN University  Poverty, inequality, slow 
growth, militarism 
None  Slow growth in food 





None specified  Humanitarian assistance 
can fuel conflict 
Sustainable livelihoods 
critical to peace 
World Bank  Poverty, economic decline, 
dependence on primary 
product exports 
Dependence on primary 
product exports a key 
factor in conflict 
Poverty, inequality, 
declining per capita 





Economic, political, and social 
factors, not environmental 
scarcities 
Openness to trade has 
indirect pacifying effects, 
but reliance on primary 
product exports 
contributes to conflict 
None specified 
Sources:  State Failure Task Force:  Esty et al. 1995, 1998; Goldstone et al. 2003; Marshall and Gurr 2003.  
Environmental security:  Homer-Dixon 1999.  Ethnic conflict:  Paarlberg 2000; Gurr and Harff 2000; 
Marshall and Gurr 2003.  UN University: Nafziger and Auvinen 2000.  International Development 
Organization:  Schafer 2002.  World Bank:  Collier 2003.  PRIO:  de Soysa 2000, 2002; Hegre, Gissinger, 
and Gleditsch 2003. 
                                                 
6 The conflict countries in question were Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  All but Chad experienced 
decline in food production growth rates. 13 
In almost all of the affected countries, where the majority of the workforce 
depended on agricultural livelihoods (World Bank 2003), civil war lowered per capita 
GDP by an estimated 2.2 percentage points per year (World Bank 2000, 57).  UNICEF 
statistics also documented little improvement in child malnutrition and mortality rates in 
conflict countries, which are unlikely to design and implement plans for child survival, 
even if they have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Mason, Csete, and 
Jonsson 1996).  In national budgets, military spending far exceeded peaceful social and 
economic expenditures for agriculture and rural development, including health, primary 
education, and food and nutrition programs (Sivard 1996; SIPRI 2003b).  Although this is 
largely true across countries, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, low- and middle-income 
countries devoted nearly 13 percent of government budgets to defense (World Bank 
2003).  In sum, to borrow the entitlement language of Amartya Sen (1981; 1999), conflict 
causes food insecurity by reducing food production, access to food, and human welfare 
and capabilities, through the destruction of the environment, health and health care, 
education, and other social infrastructure. 
Food Insecurity as a Cause or Correlate of Conflict 
Studies of the political economy of war seldom look directly at food insecurity as 
either a cause or a consequence of conflict.  This is due both to the complexity of the 
evidence of causation and also to the changing conceptualization of conflict. 
During the Cold War, scholars and politicians focused on the struggles for land 
and access to subsistence underlying peasant wars of the 20th century (Wolf 1969).  U.S. 
food aid helped friendly governments maintain food security and political power 
(Wallerstein 1980; Cohen 1984).  Agricultural modernization efforts, notably the Green 
Revolution in parts of Asia and the U.S. government’s Alliance for Progress in Latin 
America, were framed and presented as alternatives to the “Red Revolution” of peasant 
uprisings (Wallerstein 1980). 14 
After the Cold War, concern shifted from “war studies” to “peace studies,” which 
analyze the causes of conflict and its prevention, management, and transformation.  Some 
focused on perceived environmental scarcities and their consequences, including food 
insecurity, as either underlying or trigger causes (Homer-Dixon 1999), whereas others 
stressed political–cultural identities (Rupesinghe 1996; Paarlberg 2000; Gurr and Harff 
2000). 
In yet another reframing, modelers associated with the World Bank’s project on 
the Economics of Civil Wars, Crimes, and Violence (P. Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000; 
P. Collier 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003) considered the economic motivations for war, arguing 
that conflict was precipitated in some cases by “greed” (the desire to control resources), 
and in others by “grievance” (the perception of unfairness by those receiving the short 
end of contested resources).  They concluded that in most active conflict cases, greed 
trumps grievance (P. Collier 2000).  Their studies looked at contexts that take into 
account levels and sources of national and household income, ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, natural resource endowments, and population size.  But they do not 
focus on the root causes of conflicts, only at how warring parties pay for them (P. Collier 
2003). 
Scholars at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) likewise 
found that natural resource abundance tends to fuel civil war.  They do not find a link 
between resource scarcity and internal conflict (de Soysa 2000, 2002).  None of these 
authors, however, attempt to put multiple factors and frameworks together, to see where 
food insecurity and globalization, taken together, affect conflict potential.  
Political studies of the economic correlates of war—or of motives and 
opportunities of the combatants—have also found conflict associated with factors closely 
related to food insecurity, such as high infant mortality (Esty et al. 1995, 1998); extreme 
poverty, inequality, and declining per capita incomes (P. Collier 2003); and intergroup 
competition over land and water (Markakis 1998; Homer-Dixon 1999).  However, most 
such studies do not deal with food insecurity or agricultural trade as a direct causative or 
correlative factor in conflict.  A partial exception is the work of Nafziger and Auvinen 15 
(2000), which found that, between 1980 and 1995, poverty, low growth in incomes and 
food production, high inequality, and inflation, combined with high military spending and 
a tradition of military conflict, heightened countries’ vulnerability to humanitarian 
emergencies.  But this study did not specify the precise pathways through which these 
factors might combine and lead to conflict.  
Our own review of country case studies indicates that both greed and grievance 
are implicated in intergroup competitions over resources, including access to cash crops 
and resources to produce and profit from them, but also development and emergency aid 
(Messer, Cohen, and Marchione 2001).  The trigger conditions for violence may be 
natural, such as a prolonged drought (as in Ethiopia in 1973–74) (Shepherd 1975); 
economic, such as a change in price of the principal food (rice in Indonesia) (Fuller and 
Falcon 1999) or cash crop (coffee in Rwanda) (Uvin 1996), which deprives the affected 
population of its perceived just standard of living; or political, such as the denial of 
access to land or social welfare programs in Chiapas, Mexico (G. Collier and Quaratiello 
1999).  Along these lines, Ohlsson (2000) recognizes that the conflict potential is 
especially high when inequalities or environmental degradation or both lead to extreme 
marginalization of large segments of populations, who suffer loss of livelihoods and face 
the prospect that new generations will never be able to attain them (see, for example, 
Ohlsson 2000). 
Historically, most individuals, households, communities, and peoples denied 
access to resources adequate to feed themselves and to live their lives with dignity have 
failed to rebel because they are (1) insufficiently organized and (2) overly terrorized and 
repressed.  These conditions of unchanneled frustration and hopelessness can lead to 
violence and conflict once there emerges political leadership that can successfully 16 
mobilize this discontent in ways that serve a leader’s or group’s particular political ends, 
usually articulated as a struggle for social justice or political identity.
7 
Trade as a Cause or Correlate of Conflict 
Studies of the possible relationship between globalization and conflict have 
similarly underplayed the possible food factor, along with the steps through which trade 
and either war or peace are related.  The U.S. government-funded State Failure Taskforce 
found “openness to trade” (the share of imports and exports in GDP) to be a weak 
correlate of civil war avoidance (Esty et al. 1995, 1998).
8  But the methodology 
employed was not designed to describe the underlying peace-protecting mechanisms, so 
it does not offer much guidance to policymakers. 
The World Bank’s civil war study came to a rather contrary conclusion, finding a 
high risk of internal conflict in contexts combining low per capita income, economic 
decline, high inequality, and dependence on primary commodity exports, which can fund 
war economies (P. Collier 2003). But their examples of high-value “blood” commodities 
(gems, minerals, timber, drugs, and petroleum) generally did not include cash crops like 
                                                 
7 Wolf (1969) reviewed such revolutionary contexts with studies that suggested these earlier colonial to 
postcolonial era wars were struggles for subsistence, control over resources, and social justice.  More recent 
studies scrutinizing the predisposing contexts of civil wars in Sri Lanka in the 1980s (Little 1994) and 
Rwanda in the 1990s (Uvin 1996) find much more evidence of social inequities fueled by rhetoric and 
violence of identity politics (see Heyes 2002 on the concept of “identity politics”) further manipulated by 
demagogues. 
8 The Taskforce, now known as the Political Instability Taskforce, is made up of academic conflict experts.  
Their work was initially funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (see the Taskforce’s website at 
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/ for more information).  The first two phases of its studies also found 
democracy to be correlated with peaceful outcomes.  These studies support the Kantian peace-promoting 
tripod of economic interdependence, democracy, and membership in international organizations (O’Neal 
and Russet 2001).  They also, intentionally or unintentionally, support the Clinton Administration’s 
promotion of democracy and trade liberalization as mechanisms to foster peaceful development and prevent 
terrorism and “future Somalias and Rwandas” (USAID 1994).  Clinton was variously cited on Internet 
sources as having used the phrase, “the dark side of globalization,” to denote terrorism or the increasing 
gap between rich and poor, which can also lead to war.  See his talking points in the PBS program posted 
by Daniel Yergin (2003): “Globalization and Trade—The New Rules of the Game, Video Episode 3 
(accessed 23 December 2003, http://www.global-trade-law.com/ video.summary.commanding%20heights.doc). 17 
coffee (P. Collier and Hoeffler 1998; however, P. Collier 2000 makes passing reference 
to coffee). 
PRIO scholars bridged the gap between these two studies, determining that the 
empirical evidence supports both the view that in general, trade openness considerably 
reduces the likelihood of civil war (de Soysa 2002) but also that natural resource 
abundance tends to fuel civil war (de Soysa 2000), particularly where primary products 
are the only exports (Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch 2003).  Thus trade can contribute to 
peace, albeit indirectly, by contributing to growth.  However, across Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where cash crop production tends to increase inequalities, civil war is a more likely 
outcome, although poverty, poor governance, and violence may also result from “too 
little globalization rather than too much” (Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch 2003, 272). 
Consistent with these ambiguous findings, Tables 1 and 2 indicate no clear pattern 
of trade openness among the conflict and postconflict countries.  For some, the trade 
openness score exceeds the 2001 global average of 40 percent, the low- and middle-
income country average of 49 percent, and the high-income-country average of 38 
percent (World Bank 2003).  But quite a few of the war-prone nations have much lower 
scores.  The ambiguous results contribute to the strong disagreement in the literature over 
the relationship between global economic links and conflict.  They may also indicate that 
not enough attention has been paid to financial factors in globalization; for example, 
Addison (2005), citing the cases of Afghanistan, Angola, and Sierra Leone, demonstrates 
that international and national financial policies and farmer-unfriendly terms of trade, 
particularly for key cash crops, can precipitate or fuel conflict in new or postconflict 
situations. 
Arms and “Blood Commodities” Foster War, Not Peace 
Clearly, the nature of the commodities and the terms on which they are traded 
have considerable bearing on whether global trade is peace or war promoting.  
Globalization’s integration of markets includes a $17 billion (in constant 1990 dollars) 18 
market in arms, which conflict-prone governments buy with income from minerals, 
drugs, petroleum, and other licit and illicit commodities.  Between 1998 and 2002, legal 
arms suppliers sold $5.1 billion worth of weapons to Africa.  Globally, the black market 
in small arms is valued at $2–$10 billion, and it supports lesser crime, corruption, and 
thuggery at multiple social levels as well as full-scale war (SIPRI 2003b; O’Grady 1999; 
Mtonga 2003; Shah 2003).
9 
In Africa, military purchases are often financed through international transfers, 
including private sales of, and concessionary access to, primary commodities.  Petroleum 
and natural gas resources and their control figure prominently in many of the late 20th 
century conflicts and in geopolitics generally, from Azerbaijan to Sudan (Tables 1 and 2).  
Trade in gems, minerals, and timber finances arms and mercenaries for many current 
African and Asian hostilities.  Sales of diamonds support hostilities in West Africa and 
the DRC, which also concedes cobalt, coltan, gold, copper, and timber to its military 
supporters.  Countries that trade in these primary commodities show higher rates of 
poverty and child mortality than nations that do not, and they also have a higher 
propensity to conflict (Ross 2001; P. Collier 2003; SIPRI 2000; Kaldor 1999). 
On the opposite track, globalization also includes efforts to stem trade in illicit 
conflict-funding commodities.  The Kimberly process, which certifies diamonds as not 
financing hostilities in Africa, and a timber certification process, intended to restrict 
funds to the military in Burma, are examples of such efforts. 
In the next section, we consider the extent to which agricultural export 
commodities, particularly sugarcane, cotton, and coffee, are linked to conflict and food 
insecurity. 
                                                 
9 Peace advocates, such as the International Action Network on Small Arms, would like to see the 
implementation of an International Code of Conduct that would “stem the supply and mop up the surplus” 
of arms to countries that violate human rights standards and humanitarian norms (O’Grady 1999, 5,10).  
But this would only provide a first step to stemming the spillage of arms across borders. 19 
4.  Agricultural Trade, Conflict, and Food Insecurity:  Evidence from 
Case Studies 
Export cropping can have peace-promoting and positive food security impacts.  
But the “peace dividend” depends on the types of commodities, the scale and breadth of 
trade, the structural conditions of production and distribution of benefits, financial terms 
of trade, and a particular leader’s calculation about the costs of warfare versus the 
benefits of peace, assuming her or his side will win (Dorussen 2002).  Nutritional 
consequences depend on who controls how much of the resulting income and also the 
relative costs of basic foods.  Research suggests that trade reduces conflict incentives 
only when other internal political stressors are absent, and where trading-partner 
countries enjoy relatively symmetric economic and military relations (Schneider, 
Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003).  Otherwise, the revenues from food or cash crop 
production may qualify as one of the sources of “greed” or “grievance” in the inception, 
transformation, and postwar prevention of conflict.  Given all these qualifications, it is 
probably more instructive to examine particular case studies of cash crops, food 
insecurity, and conflict under particular political–economic conditions. 
For example, small farmers have succeeded in entering markets for high value-
added fruit and vegetable exports in such countries as Vietnam and Uganda, where an 
increase in staples output accompanied the growth in small farmers’ export production.  
Case studies also show that export cropping contributes to poverty reduction and food 
security where policies, practices, and institutions assure that small farmers, especially 
women, have access to land, capital, information, education, and health infrastructure 
(Watkins and von Braun 2003; Kherallah et al. 2002; von Braun and Kennedy 1994).  
But international marketing of cash crops such as French beans, grown for export in 
Burkina Faso and Zambia, involves multiple layers of middlemen and many cultural, 
health, and environmental considerations for both growers and consumers.  As a result, 
market conditions can shift very rapidly, reducing cash crop incomes relative to food 20 
crops (Freidberg 2004).  Power relations are not “symmetrical,” and the “playing field” is 
bumpy, not level. 
The social relations of production also exert considerable influence over the 
relationship between legal export crop production and conflict.  Transnational 
corporations (TNCs), such as United Fruit Company, have invested heavily in tropical 
agriculture, and produce fruits, coffee, and chocolate, which have large markets in 
temperate zones where they cannot be produced.  Historically, these TNCs have allied 
with national elites to control land, dominate markets and transportation, limit wages, and 
create tariff conditions favorable to their accumulation of wealth, sometimes at the 
expense of land-poor or landless workers.  They also lobby governments and 
international trade organizations to protect their investments through favorable financial 
and economic policies and sometimes through military assistance and intervention 
(Lafeber 2002; Schlesinger and Kinzer 1999).
10 
Whether cases of market shifts and income reversals push farming populations 
toward conflict also depends on what other crops and sources of incomes are possible 
substitutes, how farmers understand and respond to structural conditions of production 
and commerce, and what additional political forces drive them toward arms.  Although in 
2003 U.S. Agency for International Development administrator Andrew Natsios 
envisioned peaceful farmers in Afghanistan producing fruits, nuts, and other agricultural 
commodities such as cotton for international markets, contraband opium poppies proved 
to be a more lucrative and under-policed scenario, and their sales helped fuel continuing 
armed violence in that country (Constable 2003).  In Colombia, a sharp decline in the 
price of coffee in 2002 pushed farmers into coca production, dominated by cartels, and 
intimately linked to the country’s continuing political violence (EIU 2003).  
                                                 
10 In view of this history, it is instructive that Hamid Karzai, elected Afghan president in June 2002, stated 
emphatically that Afghanistan is no “banana republic,” and that he intended to put millions of dollars of 
external aid into “stability, security, peace, economic well-being of the Afghan people, reconstruction” 
(Dao 2002).  The reality is that post-Taliban Afghanistan is something of an “opium poppy republic,” in 
which contending warlords vie for control of turf and profits (Constable 2003). 21 
Perhaps the most important way in which trade in some primary agricultural 
commodities has proved income destabilizing and contributed to food insecurity and 
conflict, however, is through rapid changes in global markets and prices.  In the case of 
sugarcane, for example, a sudden dip in global demand based on unprecedented 
competition from artificial sweeteners and high-fructose syrups, in addition to U.S. and 
European market quotas, destabilized economies.  In the cases of coffee and cotton, 
overexpansion of production, leading to gluts in supply, with resulting price declines 
exacerbated by selective barriers to trade, were the culprits.  These changes jeopardize 
livelihoods and living standards of those who depend on income from the particular cash 
crops, and in the absence of opportunities for rapid crop substitutions or possibilities of 
other livelihood diversification, they can contribute to violence of various kinds (Revathi 
1998; Oxfam International 2002).  For example, loss of livelihoods due to the plunge in 
coffee prices contributed to social and political instability and ultimately to genocidal 
violence in Rwanda in 1994 (Uvin 1996). 
But other structural and cultural factors are also involved:  not all affected farmers 
rebel, and some continue to produce the commodity, while seeking and finding 
alternative sources of income.  In El Salvador in the late 1990s, the combination of the 
global coffee price collapse and the devastation of Hurricane Mitch, which also unearthed 
deadly landmines from the prior civil war, left poor coffee farmers destitute (Equal 
Exchange 1998).  However, farmers held out for the land reforms they had been promised 
and also benefited from emigrant remittances; they did not renew conflict.  As far as we 
know, Vietnam, whose soaring production of coffee has contributed to the world glut, has 
not experienced politically destabilizing effects (Oxfam International 2002); inequality is 
relatively low in the country (Minot, Baulch, and Epprecht 2003).  In Brazil, falling 
coffee revenues were one of many factors behind growing discontent in the early part of 
the 2000s.  But Brazilians achieved political change through the ballot box in 2002, 
electing a president who campaigned on a freedom-from-hunger platform (Jones 2003). 
Historically, conflict potential is also tied to demands for secure access to land 
and water; the original and 1990s Mexican Zapatista rebellions, for example, involved 22 
demands for land—and subsistence over and against sugarcane and cattle interests—both 
domestic and trade commodities.  Twentieth century revolutions in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua were not only ideological conflicts; they were also struggles for land and 
justice, subsistence, and control over coffee holdings and income.  Solutions feature 
“peace” (fair-trade) coffee, not just peace agreements. 
Sugarcane, Cotton, and Coffee 
Sugarcane, cotton, and coffee, which account for a substantial share of export 
earnings (see Tables 4 and 5), provide possible sources of both “greed” and “grievance” 
in the food-wars countries.  Incomes from these crops provide a major proportion of 
foreign exchange for governments and their opponents, who can use cash-crop revenues 
to buy arms; also, reports indicate that locals fight over access to land and water to grow 
them and then over the crops themselves.  In 2000, coffee alone generated over 50 
percent of Ethiopia’s foreign exchange earnings.  In Burundi, the figure exceeds 60 
percent.  Sugar and cotton, both important cash crops for domestic and international 
markets, are also important crops in many of the conflict countries considered here, 
although their position in international trade is weakened by crop subsidy policies and 
import quota limits in the United States, the European Union, and elsewhere. 
Historically sugarcane is the crop most immediately associated with peasant 
revolution and demands for land reform, as in the Mexican Revolution of 1910, and is 
also widely associated with immiserating labor conditions, especially in the Caribbean 
and the Philippines.  Periodically, falling prices have led to sometimes-violent struggles 
over land, as landowners have sought to prevent workers from taking over idle parcels 
(Karnow 1989; Bale 1998).  More recently, owners of Philippine sugar estates in the state 
of Negros refused to redistribute land for food crop cultivation, as workers demanded.  
But rather than engage in armed rebellion, former sugarcane workers have collaborated 
with NGOs to develop other sources of income and attracted international attention by 
mobilizing around the right to food (FIAN 2002).  There is also an incipient organic and 23 
Table 4—Countries in conflict and coffee, cotton, and sugar export value as percent of 
total export value 
Region/country Coffee  Cotton  Sugar 
 (percent) 
Sub-Saharan Africa       
  Burundi  61.9  *  4.1 
  Congo, Republic of   *  *  0.63 
  Congo, Democratic Republic of  5.1  *  * 
  Ethiopia  50.7  1.1  2.0 
  Guinea  0.9  0.9  * 
  Liberia  *  *  * 
  Rwanda  32.8  *  * 
  Somalia  *  *  * 
  Sudan  *  1.4  1.1 
  Tanzania  10.9  6.8  1.4 
  Uganda  27.2  4.9  * 
Asia      
  Afghanistan  *  *  * 
  Burma  *  *  * 
  India  *  *  * 
  Indonesia  *  *  * 
  Nepal  *  *  * 
  The Philippines  *  *  * 
  Sri Lanka  *  *  * 
Europe      
  Russia  *  *  * 
  Croatia  *  *  * 
Latin America       
  Colombia  8.2  *  1.5 
  Peru  3.2  0.2  0.2 
Near East/North Africa       
  Algeria  *  *  * 
  Iraq  *  *  * 
  Israel-Palestine  *  *  * 
  Turkey  *  *  * 
Sources:  FAOSTAT 2003; FAO 2000, 2002. 
* Data not available or not applicable. 
 
fair-trade market in cane sugar (World Shops 2003; Equal Exchange 2005).  This is an 
example of how “alternative globalization” attempts to fill food-security gaps and offer 
new markets, averting the hopelessness and violence associated with underemployment 
when sugarcane, as a principal cash crops, fails. 
Cotton economies historically have also been associated with immiserating labor 
conditions and violent conflict (Moore 1966) and disastrous income fluctuations for small 
farmers.  World prices for cotton, like those of other agricultural export commodities, are  24 
Table 5—Postconflict countries and coffee, cotton, and sugar export value as percent of 
total export value 
Region/country Coffee  Cotton  Sugar 
  (percent) 
Sub-Saharan Africa       
  Angola  0.05  *  * 
  Central African Republic  2.75  6.2  0.03 
  Côte d’Ivoire  6.5  3.8  0.64 
  Eritrea  *  *  * 
  Mozambique  0.85  3.2  9.29 
  Sierra Leone  *  *  * 
  South Africa  *  *  * 
  Togo  3  12  0.22 
Asia      
  Cambodia  *  *  * 
  Tajikistan  *  *  * 
Europe      
  Armenia  *  *  * 
  Azerbaijan  *  *  * 
  Bosnia  *  *  * 
  Georgia  *  *  * 
  Serbia  *  *  * 
Latin America       
  El Salvador  11.5  *  1.5 
  Haiti  5.9  *  * 
  Guatemala  21.3  *  7.1 
  Nicaragua  27  *  5.7 
Sources:  FAOSTAT 2003; FAO 2002. 
* Data not available or not applicable. 
 
subject to sharp fluctuations, and in recent years, cotton prices have fallen precipitously, 
at least in the short term, due to U.S., Chinese, and other producer-country export 
subsidies totaling $5.8 billion annually (Watkins and von Braun 2003).  Because cotton is 
a thirsty crop, some analysts anticipate there will be an increase in interpersonal and 
intergroup violence as farmers and, in some cases, (former) pastoralists struggle over 
access to water and improved irrigated land to grow cotton, which some call “white 
gold.”  This has been reported among Afar pastoralists, fighting with government farm 
managers in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia (Nicol 2000), although again, structural 
conditions present additional motivations for conflict.  In 2003, livelihood-security 
experts observed fields that were uncultivated, unsown, and in ruins, although production 
of irrigated forage crops might revive mixed pastoralism in the region (Lautze et al. 
2003).  Anticipated income from irrigated cotton may be an added factor in longstanding 25 
struggles between pastoralists and farmers for control over land and water, further 
complicated by the state’s attempt to impose its will and determine land use.  Which 
crops receive priority is a large part of the land-value/income/conflict equation, along 
with social and political conditions governing outcomes in landholding, access to water, 
and labor conditions. 
Also, in Chad, where cotton has been the principal export since independence, 
revenues have played an important financial role in the country’s frequent bouts of civil 
war.  In the past decade, violence has flared as northern herders have shot southern 
farmers who object to animals grazing in their cotton fields (Azam and Djimtoingar 
2002). 
In Central Asia, where cotton export promotion has long undermined local natural 
resources and productive capacity around the Aral Sea, some also fear cotton could 
prompt conflict.  Downstream republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 
want water to grow cotton, while the upstream nations of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (a 
bloody civil war zone in the 1990s), want more water for food crops and electricity 
(Postel 1999; Babu and Tashmatov 2000).  
Even where cotton production is not a source of conflict over land, water, or 
control of the crop, cotton promoters, including many African leaders, likely exaggerate 
its potential contributions to peace, prosperity, and sustainable development (see 
Toumani Toure and Compaore 2003; Tefft 2000).
11  Cotton in 2003 accounted for up to 
40 percent of export revenues and 10 percent of GDP in Benin and Chad (Watkins and 
von Braun 2003).  West African leaders frequently protest that other producer nations’ 
subsidies contribute to worldwide overproduction, falling prices, and income losses for 
millions of small-scale African cotton farmers.  But if all producer countries scale up 
                                                 
11 Unquestionably, an end to U.S. cotton subsidies would terminate the illogical, countermarket trade and 
aid policies of the U.S. government, which pays U.S. cotton growers $3.4 billion a year, more than the 
annual income of Burkina Faso and Niger combined.  The resulting glut drives global prices down 25 
percent, causing West Africa to lose $190 million in revenues and rendering an additional 250,000 people 
destitute in Benin (Watkins and von Braun 2003).  At the same time, the United States provides Benin with 
$4 million a year in food aid (USAID 2003).  This puts a double burden on U.S. taxpayers. 26 
production in response to a freer market, other developing-country producers might well 
produce another market glut, with West Africa remaining at a disadvantage.  This would 
be comparable to the coffee-price crash experienced in the 1980s and 1990s after 
Vietnam rapidly expanded production (Oxfam International 2002, 2005).  Nor would a 
liberalized global cotton market solve conflict-potentiating competition for water and 
land and indeed, it might exacerbate the tensions. 
It is unclear whether the benefits from a liberalized global cotton market will 
really trickle down to poor African farmers, as African leaders (Toumani Toure and 
Compaore 2003), economists (Tefft 2000), and some NGOs (Oxfam America 2004; 
IATP 2005) assert.  Unfortunately, these scenarios leave out critical factors, such as 
worldwide production, exchange rates, relative crop and factor prices, and farmer 
landholding and marketing arrangements that together determine how much crop income 
actually reaches the farmer and the value of this income relative to the price of basic 
foods.  Another factor to be considered is whether the farmer’s land tenure and 
agricultural investment are secure and stable or subject to competition or violent seizure 
by competing individuals or groups.  The history of coffee production, as a contrary case 
in point, suggests that all these latter factors are very important:  in the absence (and 
sometimes even the presence) of commodity trade groups, agreements, and regulations 
(such as the International Coffee Agreement), commodity production can soar, glut the 
market, and drive prices downward, engendering sharp income losses at both national and 
household levels. 
Coffee is the agricultural commodity that has the closest recent interconnections 
with violent conflict.  In 2000, it was the developing world’s second largest earner of 
export revenues after petroleum.  Huge price fluctuations surrounding the “bitter brew” 
are part of the complex forces of causation that contributed to the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda, periodic regional and community violence in Mexico and Colombia, the 
unstable legacies of civil strife in Central America, and the potential for conflict 
elsewhere (Paige 1998; Oxfam International 2002).  The impact of the falling price of 
coffee on war dynamics and narco-cropping in Colombia has received substantial attention 27 
in the past few years (EIU 2003; P. Collier 2003).  Coffee incomes can also influence 
development outlooks and conflict dynamics when prices are high, as where farmers 
identified with different ethnic groups or class interests compete for access to coffee 
lands, bushes, technical and marketing assistance, and product, as in Central America 
(Paige 1998).  Independent of prices, coffee profits historically underwrote military force 
in Idi Amin’s bloody dictatorship in Uganda (Melady 2003),
12 a brutal rebel army in 
Sierra Leone (Kamara n.d.), and Ethiopia’s changing spectrum of political leadership 
(Ofcansky and Berry 1991; U.S. Department of State 2005). 
In addition to price, land tenure patterns, labor relationships, control of 
processing, transport, and the commercial system governing coffee from cultivation to 
consumption, and finally, the country’s financial system all influence whether coffee 
cultivation is more likely to contribute to prosperity and peace or inequity and violence. 
Central American national political economies historically provide the backdrop 
either for labor oppression and underdevelopment, as in Guatemala and El Salvador, or 
rising standards of living based on smallholder production and expansive social-welfare 
policies, as in Costa Rica (Paige 1998).  In El Salvador, expansion of coffee production, 
and also of cotton and sugar for export, drove smallholders off the land and into peonage.  
Mechanization after World War II then reduced employment, forcing excess labor into 
urban areas, where jobs were scarce.  These socioeconomic conditions, but especially 
coffee, polarized class relations and were root causes of civil war (Paige 1998, 105).  
During the 1980s, the government used scorched-earth tactics against the rebels, 
guaranteeing hunger and starvation for affected civilian populations (North 1985, 
especially p.112).  Subsequently, the 1990s peace process promised land reform, but 
progress in implementing it has been very slow (Power 2004; Creelman 2000).  It is not 
yet clear what role coffee will play in economic rebuilding, or if fair trade—that is, 
alternative marketing efforts that seek to assure small producers a fair return—will 
                                                 
12 In a recent letter to the editor of The Washington Post, Thomas Melady, U.S. Ambassador to Uganda 
during Amin’s rule, reflected on U.S. legislation banning imports of Ugandan coffee, given the importance 
of coffee revenues in supporting “Amin’s death squads” (Melady 2003). 28 
account for a rapidly increasing share of coffee revenues.  So far, coffee is by far the 
largest fair-trade product, but it still accounts for only a fraction of coffee sales 
worldwide. 
5.  The Peace Business:  Global Norms and Institutions 
Globalization is not just about markets or flows of labor and capital.  It also 
includes global norms and institutions promoting humanitarianism, human rights, social 
justice, and fair trade, as well as international efforts to regulate trade in “blood” 
commodities and arms, as already mentioned above.  The challenge is to make 
transnational processes favor the peace, not war, business.  
Humanitarianism 
Peace-promoting efforts such as the convention banning land mines, the new 
International Criminal Court, and the voluntary guidelines on the right to adequate food 
developed under FAO auspices, play an active but not yet sufficient role in reducing the 
destructive forces that produce conflict and food insecurity.  Improvements in famine 
early warning systems and emergency nutrition interventions, building on global 
integration of information and communications technology and transportation, enhance 
the international community’s ability to detect and respond to food crises.  Such efforts 
are guided by global humanitarian norms that assert the right to assist in zones of armed 
conflict and the right of noncombatants to be free from hunger (SPHERE 2003).  Such 
principles help break the links between conflict and hunger, as shown in UN-authorized 
military–humanitarian interventions in Iraqi Kurdistan, Somalia, and the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. 
Humanitarians, citing a global mandate and coming from all over the world, have 
also become important players, introducing a new, global ethic and set of principles for 
distributing additional global sources of relief food and other aid in conflict or 
postconflict zones.  Their “livelihood security” framing builds on household strategies for 29 
managing risk and vulnerability, taking into account household assets, entitlements, and 
possible sources of income and food (Lautze et al. 2003, compare Drèze and Sen 1989).  
Their closely related “rights-based” approach furthermore pays particular attention to 
gender, age, and other social divisions of labor in production, and differences in 
distribution of food and other resources, to understand who gets what and who is left out, 
while also attempting to build a framework for participation, by individuals, in rebuilding 
processes.  In contrast to the national and global analyses treated in the rest of this paper, 
both livelihood and rights-based strategies usually involve analysis and program 
implementation in smaller-scale social units, not whole countries or regions (Schafer 
2002). 
From this household or small-group perspective, practitioners indicate how relief 
agencies and peacekeepers often contribute to the “war economy.”  For example, 
programs established and implemented under humanitarian principles move food to those 
in need and save lives, but in the process introduce food, vehicles, weapons, and 
personnel, whose upkeep can also fuel conflict.  Or, as in the case of Somalia in 1992, 
they destroy local food production and markets because international NGO relief 
operations entered and would not leave.  International humanitarian operations then 
created demand for provisioning and armed protection that favored militarized over 
peaceful economic interests.  Food aid introduced a new primary resource available for 
looting and manipulation.  All these developments advantaged agents with arms, who 
were able to shake down peace negotiators for resources, including land (Collins and 
Weiss 1997). 
Humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations often involve external 
military forces in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities.  In 
so doing, these operations may usurp the roles of civil society in seeking to negotiate 
sustainable public services and stable relationships with government authorities (Messer 
1996b; De Waal 1997).  Military activities, as in the cases of Guatemala’s “beans and 
guns” strategy to pacify highland Maya and Mexico’s military-controlled food relief to 
Zapatista rebel areas, remind recipients who is the dominant power and may serve 30 
directly as sources of oppression (G. Collier and Quaratiello 1999).  The question of how 
U.S. plans for reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq will avoid such dilemmas remains 
unanswered.  
International humanitarians, intending to assist, may incidentally contribute to 
ongoing hostilities and distrust by allowing village committees, for example, to continue 
to discriminate against intended beneficiaries of agricultural rehabilitation programs, 
thereby heightening the potential for renewed or continued conflict (Archibald and 
Richards 2002).  In contrast, rights-based approaches analyze existing social-structural, 
ethnic, and power relations, in order to deliver services and meet basic needs in ways that 
include all social agents.  A rights-based approach begins with a deep respect for the 
inherent dignity of all, and requires aid workers to work closely with communities, to 
help people understand their rights and find ways to articulate rights demands through 
program participation (ODI 1999). 
Humanitarian and human rights advocates also make use of global 
communications technologies such as the Internet, disseminating information about the 
plight and oppression of people otherwise isolated from global scrutiny.  They draw 
attention to human rights violations and food insecurity.  The Zapatista indigenous 
conflict with the government of Mexico thus received international attention, which 
arguably prevented a crackdown by Mexican authorities, at least in the short run (G. 
Collier and Quaratiello 1999).  
But information and communications technology can serve war as well as peace.  
Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front coordinated military operations, diamond 
sales, and arms purchases via satellite phone from bases in the country’s hinterland, while 
ruthlessly keeping the local civilian populace under its control (Rupert 2000).  Indeed, 
contemporary wars seem to have moved beyond the interstate–intrastate dichotomy to a 
“trans-state” category, as they rely on international communications, transport, trade, and 
aid (Collins and Weiss 1997). 31 
6.  Reconnoitering Peace and Food Security 
Our findings suggest four points for policymakers to consider in furthering this 
global “peace and food-security business.”  Developing countries require peace in order 
to achieve more food-secure outlooks and reap potential benefits of globalization.  
Development assistance, including aid to agriculture and rural development, can deter 
conflict if it is integrated into the construction of social contexts that promote equity. 
First, conflict and food emergency countries overlap considerably.  These 
countries are often the ones that cannot make good use of the “bright side” of free-market 
globalization—the transnational capitalist outlook of prosperity based on economic 
growth, liberalized markets, and democratization.  However, these countries frequently 
do make good use of global networking, which sustains civil society agents working for 
peace.  Unfortunately, such networking also sustains powerbrokers associated with what 
pro-globalizers view as globalization’s “dark side”—international terrorism, financed by 
trade in arms, minerals and other nonrenewable resources, and drugs, and also the 
increasing gap between rich and poor that threatens peaceful development in poor 
countries.  Donors need to find ways to distribute food and agricultural assistance that 
will be equitable and not reinforce the local and regional power structures that promise 
more conflict.  The experience of long-term humanitarian and development aid field-
workers in postconflict countries, such as Sierra Leone, can help in this regard (Archibald 
and Richards 2002).  
Second, it is not export cropping per se, but rather the structures of production and 
markets and the food and financial policy context that determine local household incomes 
and peaceful or belligerent outcomes.  Contrasting Central American experiences with 
coffee production suggest the important role of national government policies in assuring 
peaceful and equitable results.  When the prices of key export crops collapsed in Latin 
America and Southeast Asia, conflict due to discontent was avoided because alternative 
livelihood sources and peaceful outlets (such as electoral politics in Brazil) were 
available.  These experiences offer lessons that should be followed up in Africa. 32 
Third, it is essential to monitor the impacts of global prices of developing 
countries’ key agricultural exports, such as coffee and cotton.  The idea, articulated 
recently by P. Collier and his team at the World Bank, of a compensatory fund (P. Collier 
2003; see also Adams 1983; Hazell, Pomareda, and Valdés 1986), merits further 
development.  This would help the “losers” from globalization to adjust and diversify 
their sources of income, so that they can get back on their feet.  It remains unclear what 
institution would run such a fund, however.  Also, as Addison and others at the UN 
University’s World Institute on Development Economics have shown, it will be 
important to factor in monetary policies, exchange rates, and the actions of export 
marketing boards, all of which can compromise small-farmer incomes and skew 
production (Addison 2005). 
Fourth, the “livelihood-security” (Adato and Meinzen-Dick 2003) and “rights-
based development” (Lungman 2004) frameworks offer positive ways to approach 
conflict prevention at the local level, but these need to be linked more effectively to 
political and economic programs at the national level.  Some development agencies have 
begun to think about integrating these approaches into their development activities, as 
have some bilateral aid donor agencies and development NGOs.  At the macro level, aid 
donors can pressure government leaders to make sure that revenues from trade go into 
human resource development, such as education and health care, and not into an individual 
leader’s bank account.  Presumably, food-security-related investments would also be a 
productive place to put public resources, although the World Bank studies do not address 
this explicitly.  They do call for international sanctions to help make it less lucrative for 
rebels to exploit primary resources (P. Collier 2003). 
Globalization can help mitigate or even prevent violence, but activities must be 
undertaken with an eye to conflict prevention and justice promotion.  Examining the 
specifics of trade in particular agricultural commodities such as coffee, cotton, and 
sugarcane allows one to see both the “root causes” of hunger and conflict and their 
interconnections and also the trigger causes.  Historically, more localized struggles for 
control over high-value agricultural commodities, and for control over the land, water, 33 
and labor resources to grow them, are part of many conflict pictures, which have included 
“blood coffee” as well as “blood diamonds,” and white, snowy cotton, not just “snow” 
processed from coca leaves.  Even basic foods, including humanitarian rations and other 
forms of food aid, can foster competition to control the distribution.  These comprise 
important dimensions of the political economies sustaining prolonged civil wars and civil 
strife in the early 21st century, as leaders seek to feed their armies and supporters, and 
deny their enemies nutrition. 
Assuring fair and equitable access to scarce water and land resources are 
important considerations in postconflict reconstruction, which can deter the likelihood of 
renewed war.  The trade regulations and market structure for particular agricultural 
commodities may also prove important where countries depend heavily on a single export 
crop that is subject to sudden price declines.  These factors also have a bearing on more 
widespread human-rights violations and livelihood disruptions.  They need greater 
emphasis in development agency assessments. 
We remain convinced that globalization offers positive norms and values to guide 
an increasingly interconnected world.  However, it will require institutions dedicated to 
peace, social justice, and sustainable food security for all, linked to development 
processes at both the grassroots and the summit, to make this bright side of globalization 
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